





The article recovers the earlier meaning of event as found in Alfred North 
Whitehead’s works, Principles of Natural Knowledge and Concept of 
Nature. In the early Whitehead, the event is considered as the metaphysical 
ultimate; such that events are the metaphysical building blocks in order to 
account for the temporal and spatial extensiveness of reality. The 
recuperation of the pre-PR concept of event is expressive of a dynamic of 
extending over, or passing into, of one event to another. This dynamic is 
explicitly absent in the actual occasion of Process and Reality, after 




he concept of event in Whitehead is itself a flux of meanings 
reflective of the development of his metaphysical thoughts. 
Scholars are wont   in agreement as to how it plays exactly in the 
development of his metaphysics from An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Natural Knowledge (heretofore, PNK) to Modes of 
Thought. In his early writings, particularly on the philosophy of 
science, the concept of event plays a significant role as one of the 
types of entities “yielded for our knowledge by our perceptions of 
nature” (PNK 60). Events are the ultimate units of reality; they are 
“the ultimate facts of nature” (PNK 4). A few years later, after the 
publication of Principles of Natural Knowledge in 1919, there was a 
fundamental metaphysical shift in the thought of Whitehead, a 
“turn to atomism” in 1925. In the evolution of Whitehead’s 
thought concerning the event, at the time of Process and Reality, 
(heretofore PR) the concept of event recedes from metaphysical 
importance. The event in Process and Reality does not even have a 
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categoreal status; it does not count as one of the Categories of 
Existence (see PR 22). This “turn” in Whitehead’s philosophy 
Stengers identifies as happening around April 1925. She explains 
that in Process and Reality, “l’événement aura tout bonnement disparu, 
ou plus précisément, aura perdu son statut conceptuel. Nous sommes donc 
parvenus ici au point critique, en ce point où s’est produit, pour Whitehead, 
ce que j’ai appelé une “adjonction,” au seuil également d’une aventure qui, 
en quelque quatre ans, fera de lui le plus singulier des penseurs spéculatifs 
du XXe siècle. Nous sommes en avril 1925” (Penser 217). 
 After the “turn,” Whitehead still continues to refer to the 
“ultimate facts of nature” in his metaphysics, but now no longer in 
reference to events but to actual occasions.1 The concept of an 
actual occasion accommodates the “atomistic turn” in Whitehead’s 
philosophy. This is clearly evident in the fact that though events (in 
Principles of Natural Knowledge) are capable of extending over or 
passing into other events, actual occasions (in Process and Reality) 
perish in the completion of their becoming. Furthermore, the event 
as found in Principles of Natural Knowledge and Concept of Nature 
(and to a certain extent Science and the Modern World) becomes 
generalized after the “turn” to mean a type of a “nexus of actual 
occasions” (PR 73). It is not the goal of this essay to chart the 
evolution of the concept of event in the whole metaphysics of 
Whitehead. The task at hand here is a recuperation of the earlier 
                                                 
1 Although there is an analogy of role played by these two concepts especially 
with respect to being the ultimate reality, the rēs vera, I think it is an oversight to 
categorically identify events with actual occasions in such a way that the subtle 
distinctions between them are thrown out. Indeed, this is bluntly reflected in an 
author who reviewed Stengers’ Penser avec Whitehead who concluded that what 
Whitehead calls events in Concept of Nature becomes the actual entities or 
occasions in PR. “Depuis Le concept de nature et, en réalité, les Principia mathematica, 
Whitehead distingue dans l’expérience deux sortes de facteurs : d’une part, des facteurs de 
passage, qui sont singuliers, c’est-à-dire ne se reproduisent pas, qui comportent un devenir et 
sont étendus dans l’espace comme dans le temps ; d’autre part, des facteurs immobiles, 
susceptibles de se reproduire et, par conséquent, de faire l’objet d’une reconnaissance, et qui 
ne sont pas soumis à l’extension. Les facteurs en devenir sont les “événements dans Le 
concept de nature, et ces événements deviendront les “entités actuelles” les “occasions 
d’expérience” dans Procès et réalité.” Pierre Cassou-Noguès, "Compte-rendu de : 
Isabelle Stengers, Penser avec Whitehead, (Paris: Seuil, 2002), 582.” Methodos 6 
(2006), accessed on 5 May 2008, http://methodos.revues.org/documents527. 
html.  




meaning of event as found in Principles of Natural Knowledge and 
Concept of Nature.2 This is important because the pre-PR concept of 
event is expressive of a dynamic of extending over, or passing into, 
of one event to another. This dynamic is explicitly absent in the 




 The concept of event figures most importantly in the 
second phase of his career, during the stage of his life where 
Whitehead was reflecting on science and education. During this 
time, his thoughts were already circling on certain concepts that 
would constitute his mature contribution in cosmology and 
metaphysics. The concept of event particularly played a prominent 
role in his book Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919).3 This book 
emerged as a reflection upon the general deliverances of experience 
and how these are to be understood in the light of the then recent 
advances in modern speculative physics particularly that of 
Einstein’s theory of relativity that he finds rather disconcerting.4 
Already in here, one intimates Whitehead’s peculiar insistence on 
“concrete experience” (PNK 11) over speculation that tends to be 
in danger of falling into the snare of the fallacy of misplaced 
                                                 
2 This is not to suggest that the concept of event in the later Whitehead is 
devoid of any metaphysical significance.  The earlier notion is recuperated here 
precisely because it expresses more the sense of (1) organic unity and (2) inclusion. 
These are elements compromised by the atomic turn in Whitehead where reality 
becomes viewed as discrete and separate. 
3  It is interesting to note that though the concept of event in the early 
philosophical / scientific writings of Whitehead plays a large role in PNK, in the 
two sections that Isabelle Stengers devotes to the concept of event (“Evénement et 
passage” and “L’événement de son propre point de vue”), no references appear coming 
from Principles of Natural Knowledge. It appears that in the first section (“Evénement 
et passage”) references come most from Concept of Nature, while in the second 
section (“L’événement de son propre point de vue”) references come mostly from Science 
and the Modern World and Process and Reality. 
4 One notes this when he prefaces the book by saying that it “is largely 
concerned with providing a physical basis for the more modern views [of 
speculative physics] which have thus emerged. The whole investigation is based on 
the principle that the scientific concepts of space and time are the first outcome 
of the simplest generalizations from experience, and that they are not to be looked 
for at the tail end of a welter of differential equations” (PNK vi). 
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concreteness. The first deliverance of this insistence on concrete 
experience is the disclosure of the event. As Isabelle Stengers argues 
“‘[é]vénement’ est le premier des noms associés par Whitehead à ce dont 
nous avons l’expérience” (Penser 59). That this book is a work of 
natural philosophy rather than metaphysics is clearly indicated by 
Whitehead when he avers that his concern here is with “[n]ature, 
that is, with the object of perceptual knowledge, and not with the 
synthesis of the knower and the known” (PNK 7). Nonetheless, his 
own philosophical reflection does bear significant consequences in 
metaphysical thinking particularly on the concept of event. Indeed, 
one can almost say that the whole book is an elaboration of a 
natural philosophy founded on a theory of event. In the words of 
Whitehead: 
 
The fundamental assumption to be elaborated in 
the course of this enquiry is that the ultimate facts 
of nature, in terms of which all physical and 
biological explanation must be expressed, are events 
connected by their spatio-temporal relations, and 
that these relations are in the main reducible to the 
property of events that they can contain (or extend 
over) other events which are parts of them. (PNK 4). 
In philosophy, events are more ultimate than space 
and time, constituting them as interconnected. 5 
When one considers nature as an object of inquiry, 
the whole of nature is discriminated as a complex of 
entities that comprise the data of perceptual 
knowledge. Whitehead calls this process of 
discrimination “the diversification of nature” (PNK 
59ff). Although there are infinite types of entities 
disclosed in this diversification depending on the 
varieties of procedures accomplished for this task, 
Whitehead limits the list to five types of entities: 
events, percipient objects, sense-objects, perceptual 
objects and scientific objects. It is not the goal here 
                                                 
5 “The externality of nature is the outcome of [the] relation of extension. Two 
events are mutually external, or are ‘separate,’ if there is no event which is part of 
both. Time and space both spring from the relation of extension…. It follows that 
time and space express relations between events” (PNK 61). 
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to elaborate fully on the interrelatedness of these 
five types since what concerns us presently is the 
elucidation of a certain understanding of event. 
Nonetheless, these five types may be subdivided into 
two, namely events and objects, and it is to these that 
our attention shall be focused. 
 
 In Principles of Natural Knowledge, Whitehead speaks of the 
event as the metaphysical ultimate. As we see quoted above, 
Whitehead identifies events as “the ultimate facts of nature” (PNK 
4). Whitehead continues with this identification of events as the 
“ultimate facts” in his other earlier works: “If we are to look for 
substance anywhere, I should find it in events which are in some 
sense the ultimate substance of nature” (CN 19); “Events are the 
“more concrete elements of nature” (CN 33); “The event is the unit 
of things real” (SMW 152). One sees here that events, in the early 
Whitehead, are the metaphysical building blocks in order to 
account for the temporal and spatial extensiveness of reality. In 
Principles of Natural Knowledge, the event plays a singular role in 
explaining the deliverances of experience and the essential concepts 
of science. 6  For Whitehead, the fundamental metaphysical 
problem is how to account for both change and permanence, being 
and becoming, and he finds this in the very concept of event:  
 
The ultimate facts of nature, in terms of which all 
physical and biological explanation must be 
expressed, are events connected by their spatio-
temporal relations, and that these relations are in the 
main reducible to the property of events that they can 
contain (or extend over) other events which are parts 
of them. (PNK 4, emphases added). 
                                                 
6 “Our perception of time is as a duration, and these instants have only been 
introduced by reason of a supposed necessity of thought. In fact absolute time is 
just as much a metaphysical monstrosity as absolute space. The way out of the 
perplexities, as to the ultimate data of science in terms of which physical 
explanation is ultimately to be expressed, is to express the essential scientific 
concepts of time, space and material as issuing from fundamental relations 
between events and from recognitions of the characters of events. These relations 
of events are those immediate deliverances of observation which are referred to 
when we say that events are spread through time and space” (PNK 8). 
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 We have already quoted this aforesaid text but what needs 
to be emphasized this time is the phrase: relation of events and the 
property or character of events. There is exhibited in experience an 
externality of nature, and this externality is the outcome of the 
relation of extension whereby events are the relata. The relation 
between two events is explicative of space and time, like how, in 
geometry, two points in a plane convey extensiveness, either 
temporal or spatial.7 Different properties issue from relations of 
events. If they be properties issuing from spatial relations then what 
is exhibited in the relation of extension is that events are actualities; 
they are matters of fact. If these properties issue from temporal 
relations, then what is exhibited therein is that events involve the 
becoming of nature. Explaining this further, one has to bear in 
mind that because of this conveyance of extensiveness in the 
relations between events, this same “relation of extension exhibits 
events as actual—as matters of fact—by means of its properties which 
issue in spatial relations” (PNK 61). In this regard, an event then is 
what occupies the place in a determined locus: “an event is there 
and not here [or, here and not there]” (PNK 62). The relation that 
events exhibit is something determined and final; it establishes 
spatial boundaries (that is, here not there) that account for 
externality. In this regard, an “actual event is divested of all 
possibility” (PNK 61). Whitehead continues that an event 
 
… is what does become in nature. It can never 
happen again; for essentially it is just itself, there and 
then. An event is just what it is, and is just how it is 
related and it is nothing else. Any event, however 
similar, with different relations is another event. 
There is no element of hypothesis in any actual 
event…. Time and space, which are entirely actual 
and devoid of any tincture of possibility, are to be 
                                                 
7 It needs to be noted that events here are not to be confused with objects. 
“Other natural objects which are not events are only in time and space derivatively, 
namely, by reason of their relations to events. Great confusion has been caused to 
the philosophy of science by this neglect of the derivative nature of the spatial and 
temporal relations of objects of various types” (PNK 61). 
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sought for among the relations of events. (PNK 61-
62). 
 
 With regard to relations of events that exhibit externality, 
“events are essentially elements of actuality” (PNK 61), that is, they 
are explicative of the ingression of possibilities into the realm of the 
concrete or real. Since events are already devoid of possibilities, 
“[e]vents never change” (PNK 62). But this does not exhaust the 
whole drama of events in the early Whitehead, that is, events are 
not only constitutive of the domain of Being. They are likewise 
essentially “elements of becomingness” (PNK 61). How is this to be 
explained, especially if relations of events constitute them in spatio-
temporal determinateness? Indeed, if events never change, they are 
final, how then are they essentially elements of becomingness? On 
this respect, one may notice Whitehead’s metaphysical 
incorporation of the notion of evolution into his system of thought. 
Nature is evolving, developing, but how does this come about? 
Whitehead explains himself thus: 
 
Nature develops, in the sense that an event e 
becomes part of an event e´ which includes (i.e. 
extends over) e and also extends into the futurity 
beyond e.  Thus in a sense the event e does change, 
namely, in its relations to the events which were not 
and which become actual in the creative advance of 
nature. The change of an event e, in this meaning of 
the term ‘change,’ will be called the ‘passage’ of e; 
and the word ‘change’ will not be used in this sense. 
Thus we can say that events pass but do not change. The 
passage of an event is its passing into some other 
event which is not it (PNK 62, emphases added). 
 
 This approach of Whitehead is an ingenious synthesis of 
the problematic of the unity of being and becoming. Instead of 
reducing one as a phenomenon of the other, even sometimes 
reducing one as a mere shadow of reduced reality, Whitehead tries 
to affirm the reality of both actuality and becoming. He 
accomplished this by articulating a view of events as passing but not 
undergoing change. Indeed, change is accounted for by the 
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inclusion or extending over of events beyond another event which 
it is not. The singularity of event then is preserved, yet its own 
transformation is accommodated in terms of inclusive relation or 





How does an event enter into experience? For Whitehead, 
events are properly speaking apprehended. This is a distinct 
nomenclature that Whitehead introduces, particularly in Principles 
of Natural Knowledge, in order to suggest that events are happenings 
that are not alien from us. Events infect our own experience with 
their own texture and consistency. Events surround us and likewise 
pass through us as “the medium within which our physical 
experience develops, or, rather, they are themselves the 
development of that experience” (PNK 63). When one considers 
the event of looking before a MacBook while typing these very 
words, the event as such is never independent of me. Standing 
before the event, I can never be a mere spectator.8 The event is that 
very condition of comportment whereby that which is conscious of 
and that of which one is conscious participate in a unique structure 
that is permanent and unrepeatable. As of this moment that I am 
still here before my laptop typing these very words, the earlier event 
(e) now extends over this very event I find myself in the present (e). 
The earlier event is unique and permanent, yet passes over into the 
current event because they are both related within a single extensive 
continuum (read: I am still in front of my laptop typing these 
words). These events are said to be apprehended because I am aware 
of these things happening and these happenings involve me as 
playing a character in the unfolding of the drama of each event.  
 
                                                 
8 John Dewey is critical of what he calls a “spectator theory of knowledge,” 
that is, the view that the acquisition and management of knowledge are 
accomplished independently of the immediate milieu of the knower. See Nicholas 
Rescher, Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy (Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press, 1996), 124-25. 
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However, it is not simply events that enter into experience. 
Indeed, an event as such is not solely explicative of reality. Other 
than relations of events exhibiting extentionality, one has to take 
account likewise of permanences. If an event is characterized by 
happening or passing over, one may speak of objects as the 
“permanent” side of the event. Experience divulges two things: on 
the one hand, events which are apprehended, and on the other hand, 
objects which are—and this is the distinct nomenclature given by 
Whitehead—recognized. The relation of event to object is that objects 
“convey the permanences recognized in events” (PNK 62). If 
experience does not recognize any permanence in the flux of events 
that it apprehends, then no object is divulged, undermining 
experience’s own intentional structure, a scenario that logically 
ends in chaos. For Whitehead, rational thinking entails the 
comparison of events and this would not be achieved without the 
recognition of objects, which are the recognitions of permanence 
amidst the passing over of events.9 
How does Whitehead account for the object of experience? 
In broad strokes, objects are the opposites of events. If events do 
not change and instead pass, objects do change. The passing of 
event is an event extending itself over another event. An object is 
supposed to change because of the same object’s relation to diverse 
events. For example, the Basilica of Koekelberg in Brussels is said 
to be changing in the sense that it is not the same now as it was way 
back in 1971, the year of its completion. It is the same basilica 
(permanence), yet in relation to events that surround it so to speak, 
one acknowledges change in the object. The basilica is permanent 
because, in Whitehead’s view, objects are without time and space. 
This is not to mean that objects are not in a specific time and space, 
but that there is no “fixedness of relations,” temporal or spatial, 
which an event possesses (PNK 64).10  That the object changes “is 
merely the variety of its relations to the various events which are 
passing in time and in space” (PNK 63).  
                                                 
9 “Rational thought which is the comparison of event with event would be 
intrinsically impossible without objects” (PNK 64). 
10  “Events (in a sense) are space and time, namely, space and time are 
abstractions from events. But objects are only derivatively in space and time by 
reason of their relations to events” (PNK 63). 
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Furthermore, if events are matters of fact, that is, they are 
actualities that no longer accommodate possibilities in themselves, 
whenever “the concept of possibility can apply to a natural element, 
that element is an object” (PNK 64). Since relations are external to 
an object’s being (unlike the case of events), there will always be the 
possibility of recurrence of objects in different events. Indeed, as we 
see in the case of the Basilica of Koekelberg, this object traverses 
various (temporally related) events such that even at the present 
time it still holds a relation to the event that is expressed in saying 
“I am visiting the Basilica.”11 In Whitehead’s estimation, the theory 
of natural object has been wrecked by misplacing the axiom that 
one thing can only be in one place at a time from the event to the 
object. An object can be in any place at a particular time. Its spatio-
temporal relations are not intrinsic to it, accommodating 
possibilities of localization from other spatio-temporal locus. Only 
events can be here (not there) and now (neither before nor after). 
Consequential to an object’s indifference to spatio-temporal 
relations, the identity of an object is internally constituted. An 
object is a unity in itself. It does not have “parts” because strictly 
speaking it has no fixed relation to time and space. As such, this 
character of having parts belongs to events. Whitehead explains 
himself more clearly in the following: 
 
The fundamental rule is that events have parts and 
that—except in a derivative sense, from their 
relations to events—objects have no parts. On the 
other hand the same object can be found in 
different parts of space and time, and this cannot 
hold for events. Thus the identity of an object may 
be an important physical fact, while the identity of 
an event is essentially a trivial logical necessity. Thus 
the prisoner in the dock may be the man who did 
                                                 
11 In Concept of Nature Whitehead gave the example of the Great Pyramid in 
speaking of the relation of an object to different events: “An object is an entity of 
a different type from an event. For example, the event which is the life of nature 
within the Great Pyramid yesterday and to-day is divisible into two parts, namely 
the Great Pyramid yesterday and the Great Pyramid to-day. But the recognizable 
object which is also called the Great Pyramid is the same object to-day as it was 
yesterday” (CN 77). 
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the deed. But the deed lies in the irrevocable past; 
only the allegation of it is before the court and 
perhaps (in some countries) a reconstitution of the 
crime. Essentially the very deed itself is never there. 
(PNK 66).  
 
 That our experience of the natural world divulges flux 
(event) and permanence (object) is clearly the goal that Whitehead 
is pursuing in his natural philosophy and metaphysics. Even before 
his famous critique of scientific materialism in Concept of Nature 
and Science and the Modern World, the concept of event in Principles 
of Natural Knowledge lays already the foundation of a process 
metaphysics that avoids the bifurcation of nature that Descartes 
and the modern development of science have bequeathed.12 His 
own natural philosophy, particularly in his critique of the theory of 
relativity, is a rejection of the substance-quality model of 
metaphysics and the priority of matter over space-time in physics.13 
“On the old theory of relativity, Time and Space are relations 
between materials; on our theory,” continues Whitehead, “they are 
relations between events” (PNK 26).  In order to schematically 
illustrate the distinction between events and objects, particularly as 
these concepts are explicated in Principles of Natural Knowledge, a 
table is provided below (see Table 4.1.).  
 




Relations of objects 
 
Qualities of events 
                                                 
12 Materialism here understood as the view whereby “the material, the space, 
the time, the various laws concerning the transition of material configurations, are 
taken as ultimate stubborn facts, not to be tampered with” (SMW 142). 
13 See Ronny Desmet, "The Rebirth of the Ether," in Chromatikon III: Annuaire 
de la philosophie en procès, eds. Michel Weber and Pierfrancesco Basile (Louvain-la-
Neuve: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2007), 69-93. See likewise Yutaka 
Tanaka, “Einstein and Whitehead: The Principle of Relativity Reconsidered," 
Historia Scientiarum 32, (1987): 43-61. 
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Never change They change 
They have parts They have a unity (i.e., don’t 
have parts) 
Events enter into 
experience by being 
lived through; they 
extend around us 
Objects enter into experience 
by intellectuality of 
recognition 
They don’t have the 
possibility of recurrence; 
their self-identity is 
wholly dependent on its 
relations; there is 
fixedness of relations 
They have the possibility of 
recurrence because their self-
identity is not dependent on 
relations; they lack fixedness 
of relations 
Can only be in one 
place at one time 
Not the case with objects 
The continuity of nature 
lies in events 
Atomic properties of nature 
lies in objects 
We apprehend events We recognize objects 
They are not permanent They are permanent 
Whatever is purely 
matter of fact 
When the concept of 
possibility applies, that is an 
object 
Identity of an event is 
essentially a trivial 
logical necessity 
 
Identity of an object is an 
important physical fact 
One can see from the foregoing discussion that the concept 
of event in the early Whitehead appears richer and denser than the 
later concept of event as “nexus of actual occasions” (PR 73) because 
it articulates, surprisingly, a more organic notion of “the ultimate 
substance of nature” (CN 19). This is noticeable because it seeks to 
preserve the dynamic of extending over of events into another. This 
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early concept of event typically accommodates Whitehead’s own 
penchant of maintaining healthy tensions between dualities. The 
event is explicative of both being and becoming, of flux (event) and 
permanence (object), by the properties and relations of the 
extensionality of events. If the extension issues into spatiality, 
actualization ensues, and if extension issues into temporality, event 
becomes constitutive of becomingness. Defining an event as a 
process of integration, as “the grasping into unity of a pattern of 
aspects” (SMW 119), the event as such is characteristically open to 
that which is beyond itself, supplying data for its integration.14  
What we have, then, in the early Whitehead is a denser 
conceptualization of event ontology. The subject-quality model that 
one finds in classical metaphysics of substance is transformed by 
Whitehead into a metaphysics of process whereby reality is 
constituted by the interrelation of events in some determinate 
continuum. Matter, given prominence in classical metaphysics 
because it becomes the repository of qualities to which they are 
predicated, is subsumed conceptually as the recognition of 
permanence that one apprehends in events and relations of events. 
The question now is, why is it that the theory of event in Principles 
of Natural Knowledge, which accommodates a balance between flux 
(event) and permanence (object), recedes in the background by 
becoming generalized as a type of “nexus of actual occasions” (PR 
73) in the development of Whitehead’s metaphysics in Process and 
Reality? In Process and Reality, Whitehead no longer speaks of events 
as “the ultimate substance of nature” (PNK 4). The “final real things 
of which the world is made up” is now referred to as actual 
                                                 
14 This openness is crucial for the articulation of the event because it provides 
the avenue for the interruption of transcendence. Whitehead’s event is open to 
the ad-venire of the divine. In saying that the event is capable of extending over or 
passing into other events, one intuits the dynamic of the event of the religious. It 
is capable of transforming, molding and renewing the lives and thoughts of those 
that have attained contact with the divine. The event of the religious endures, and 
“by reason of this inherent endurance the event is important for the modification 
of its environment” (SMW 119). This concept of event is capable of articulating 
the notion of unfolding, of e-venire in the event of the religious. See Kenneth C. 
Masong, “Becoming-Religion: A. N. Whitehead and a Contemporary 
Philosophical Reflection on Religion” PhD diss., (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 
2008).  
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occasions (PR 18). Isabelle Stengers, as quoted above, argues that in 
Whitehead there is a turn of thinking in the 1920’s. According to 
the notes taken by William Ernest Hocking, on 7 April 1925, 
Whitehead remarked that he’s in a “state of confusion” perhaps 
primarily because he had come to the conclusion that science has a 
need for an “atomic theory of time” (Penser 217). Indeed, by the 
time of the writing of Process and Reality, Whitehead concludes 




This “atomistic turn” in Whitehead’s thought, Stengers 
argues, proceeds from his consideration of event “from its own 
standpoint” (or in the words of Stengers, “l’événement de son propre 
point de vue”15). In her Penser avec Whitehead, Stengers offers a fresh 
interpretation of Whitehead based on some reflections on his 
works arranged in a generally chronological order.16 It is not our 
goal here to elaborate on how Stengers reads Whitehead. The 
concern is regarding the concept of event and the two sections 
(“Evénement et passage” and “L’événement de son propre point de vue?”) 
that deal precisely on this issue in her book. It needs to be noted 
that both sections are found in the first part, that is, on the 
transition from the philosophy of nature to metaphysics. The first 
section deals with the early thoughts of Whitehead on the event, 
that is, the suggestion of the passage as delivered in experience with 
references mostly coming from Concept of Nature and roughly 
reflecting what we had been pondering on the concept of event in 
                                                 
15 The elaboration of this otherwise unnoticeable phrase in Whitehead forms 
a whole section of the first part (from natural philosophy to metaphysics) of 
Stengers’ Penser avec Whitehead.  
16 The 581-page book is basically divided into two parts, the transition of his 
thought from natural philosophy to metaphysics (part I) and an elaboration of his 
cosmology (part II). Far from simply being a chronological commentary, Stengers 
aims instead “to think with Whitehead.” As such, the book, though profoundly 
insightful, does not unfortunately help any novice in process thought in making 
distinctions as to where Whitehead ends and where Stengers begins (not to 
mention the Deleuzean rhizomatic networks that pervade throughout). But this 
she clearly expects as the point is to embark on an adventure of thinking, as on a 
raft, to “get wet” (or perhaps even to submerge oneself) in the act of thinking with 
Whitehead, but without getting drowned. See Stengers, Penser, 18-19. 
44
CONCLUSION: THE ATOMISTIC TURN
RECUPERATING THE CONCEPT OF EVENT IN THE EARLY WHITEHEAD
 
 
Principles of Natural Knowledge. The more crucial one is the second 
section wherein Stengers asks herself (or perhaps it was a question 
to Whitehead):  “L’événement de son propre point de vue?” 
For Whitehead, reality is constituted by a two-fold change 
or transformation. On the one hand, reality itself is said to be 
changing: “all things flow” (PR 208). On the other hand, it is not 
just reality as such that is perceived to be in constant becoming, our 
own perspective of reality likewise changes. Consider what he says 
regarding religion: “It is the peculiarity of religion that humanity is 
always shifting its attitude towards it” (RM 13). This shift of attitude 
or modification of viewpoints accrues not simply due to an internal 
conversion of a mind dislodged from all external influence. The 
change of perspective in fact is but part of the very texture of reality. 
For Whitehead, reality is not a theatre whereby there is a clear-cut 
separation between the actors and the audience; the actors doing 
their thing on stage and the audience as flaccid receptors of scenes, 
music, conversations and emotions. The Whiteheadian view of 
reality approximates what Charles Taylor, commenting on 
Rousseau, calls the model of “public festival, where everyone is both 
performer and spectator.” 17  If “relations are treated as 
fundamental” (PNK 61), and if “[n]ature is a process” (CN 53), it is 
but logical that the very character that typifies reality is likewise 
inclusive of the relation of the knower and the known. For 
Whitehead, to approach nature as an object of enquiry is the 
domain of natural philosophy, but when the investigation deals 
already with the synthesis of the knower and the known, one 
traverses the province of metaphysics (cf. PNK vii). Metaphysically 
considered then the advancement of knowledge entails what 
Stengers calls an “ethopoietic character,” that is, in the production 
of knowledge there is a concomitant transformation of the knower 
                                                 
17 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 205. In the same page, Taylor quotes 
Rousseau: “Mais quels seront enfin les objets de ces spectacles? Rien, si l’on veut. Avec la 
liberté, partout où règne l’affluence, le bien-être y règne aussi. Plantez au milieu d’une place 
publique un piquet couronné de fleurs, rassemblez-y le peuple, et vous aurez une fête. Faites 
mieux encore: donnez les spectateurs en spectacle; rendez-les acteurs eux-mêmes; faites que 
chacun se voie et s’aime dans les autres, afin que tous en soient mieux unis.” Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Lettre à d’Alembert sur les spectacles, in Du Contrat Social (Paris: Classiques 
Garnier, 1962),  225. 
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also (Thinking 8). What natural philosophy considers its object of 
study, metaphysics generalizes in such a way that the fundamental 
principles derived from perceptual knowledge become exemplified 
in the subject of knowledge itself. The radicality of the metaphysics 
of process that Whitehead espouses lies in the contention that “no 
individual subject can have independent reality, since it is a 
prehension of limited aspects of subjects other than itself” (SMW 
151). The Whiteheadian subject is not purely an agency of effect; it 
is a duality, the terminus a quo and terminus ad quem of concrescent 
feelings. It is a subject-superject (See PR 28). The external world 
contaminates us. The idea of a pure self-identity is rendered an 
illusion before the truth of nature as the unfolding of becoming. 
What we have here then is the case whereby the vision discovered 
by Whitehead concerning the understanding of nature as a flux 
enters into self-reflexivity such that the very truth discerned with 
regard to the understanding of nature as a rhythmic dance of flux 
and permanence becomes the principle that underlies the very 
nature of the inquirer. When Stengers asks, “L’événement de son 
propre point de vue?” she was not suggesting that our perspective of 
reality should be taken from the standpoint of events, but that our 
self-identity, and all perspectives we take, is recognized as an 
instantiation of the evental character discerned in reality. 
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